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Abstract
This article analyses the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (EU-Ukraine AA). It argues that this 
new legal framework, which has the objective to establish a unique form of political association 
and economic integration, is characterized by three specific features: comprehensiveness, 
complexity and conditionality. After a brief background of the EU-Ukraine relations, the following 
aspects are scrutinized: legal basis and objectives, institutional framework and mechanisms of 
enhanced conditionality, and legislative approximation. In addition, constitutional challenges 
for the effective implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA are discussed. Based upon a comparison 
with other EU external agreements, it is demonstrated that the EU-Ukraine AA is an innovative 
legal instrument providing for a new type of integration without membership.
Key Words: European Union, Ukraine, Association Agreement, Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area, integration, legislative approximation.
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Introduction
“We are here to sign the Association Agreements between the European Union and 
each of your countries. These are not just any other agreements —  but milestones in 
the history of our relations and for Europe as a whole. In Kiev and elsewhere, people 
gave their lives for this closer link to the European Union. We will not forget them.”1
1 European Council, “Statement at the Signing Ceremony of the Association Agreements with Georgia, 
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine,” Brussels, 27 June 2014, EUCO 137/14, accessed August 30, 2015, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143415.pdf.
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This statement of the President of the European Council was made on 27 June 2014 at the 
signing ceremony of the bilateral Association Agreements (AAs) between the European Union 
(EU) and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. This new generation of AAs will replace the outdated 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) as the basic legal framework for the bilateral 
relations between the EU and those countries.
According to Herman Van Rompuy, the EU-Ukraine AA —  which served to a large extent as 
a template for the agreements with Moldova and Georgia —  is “the most advanced agreement 
of its kind ever negotiated by the European Union.”2 A cursory reading of the agreement, 
counting around 2,140 pages in the Official Journal including 46 annexes, 3 protocols and a 
joint declaration, already reveals that it is unprecedented both in terms of scope and level of 
detail.3 The agreement essentially aims to deepen the political and economic relations between 
Ukraine and the EU through the establishment of an enhanced institutional framework and 
innovative provisions on regulatory and legislative approximation. Of particular significance 
is the ambition to set up a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), leading to 
“Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU internal market.”4 Accordingly, the EU-Ukraine AA 
belongs to the selected group of “integration-oriented agreements”, i. e., agreements including 
principles, concepts and provisions of EU law that are to be interpreted and applied as if the 
third State is part of the EU.5 Such agreements are an exceptional phenomenon in the practice 
of the EU’s external action. Apart from the well-known multilateral examples of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the Energy Community Treaty (EnC Treaty) and the European 
Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreement, a limited number of specific bilateral agreements 
also deserve this qualification.
It will be argued that the EU-Ukraine AA is unique in many respects and, therefore, 
provides a new type of integration without membership.6 The Agreement can be characterized 
by three specific features: comprehensiveness, complexity and conditionality.
2 European Council, Press Remarks by H. Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, following 
the EU-Ukraine Summit, Brussels, 25 February 2013, EUCO 48/13, accessed August 30, 2015,  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-13–74_en.htm.
3 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and Ukraine of the other part, OJ, 2014, L 161/3.
4 The explicit reference to “Ukraine’s gradual integration in the EU Internal Market” as one of the 
EU-Ukraine AA’s objectives (Art. 1 (d)) is quite remarkable. In comparison, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements (EMAAs) and pre-accession instruments such as the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkan countries do not include such a reference 
in their corresponding articles. For example, the objectives of the SAAs only aim “to promote 
harmonious economic relations and develop gradually a free trade area” (Art. 1(1)(f) EU-Serbia SAA, 
OJ, 2010, L 28/2). The EMAAs aim to “establish the conditions for the gradual liberalisation of trade in 
goods, services and capital” (Art. 1(2) EU-Morocco EMAA, OJ, 2000, L 70/2).
5 The expression “integration-oriented agreements” is borrowed from Marc Maresceau. See: Marc 
Maresceau, “Les accords d’intégration dans les relations de proximité de l’Union européenne,” in Les 
frontières de l’Union européenne, ed. Claude Blumann (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2013), 151–92.
6 Adam Łazowski, “Enhanced Multilateralism and Enhanced Bilateralism: Integration without 
Membership in the European Union,” Common Market Law Review 45.5 (2008).  
Roman Petrov, Guillaume Van der Loo, Peter Van Elsuwege. The EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement: A New Legal Instrument of Integration Without Membership?
3
First, the EU-Ukraine AA is a comprehensive framework agreement covering the entire 
spectrum of EU-Ukraine relations. Hence, it includes provisions dealing with the whole array 
of EU activities, including cooperation and convergence in the field of common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) as well as cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ).7 
Moreover, due to the inclusion of provisions on nuclear energy and areas falling within Member 
State competences, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and all EU Member 
States are also contracting parties to the agreement. Whereas the Treaty of Lisbon significantly 
facilitates the conclusion of what used to be called “cross-pillar agreements,” the comprehensive 
scope of the Agreement necessarily generates a certain complexity. For instance, the EU-
Ukraine AA provisions dealing with the AFSJ do not bind the United Kingdom and Ireland as 
EU Member States as a result of the “opt-out” granted under Protocol 21 to the EU Treaties. 
Yet, those countries are bound as separate contracting parties due to the mixed nature of the 
agreement and can decide to “opt in” as part of the EU after notifying Ukraine. A specific regime 
also applies to Denmark, in accordance with Protocol 22 to the EU Treaties. The comprehensive 
scope of the EU-Ukraine AA also implies that in certain areas of cooperation there is an overlap 
with existing agreements and obligations. Pursuant to Article 479 of the EU-Ukraine AA, such 
(existing) agreements “shall be considered part of the overall bilateral relations as governed 
by this Agreement and as forming part of a common institutional framework.” As a result, the 
Agreement includes various provisions clarifying the relationship with other bilateral and 
multilateral agreements aiming to ensure a coherent legal framework for EU-Ukraine relations. 
This, too, contributes to the complexity of the Agreement.
Second, the complexity of the EU-Ukraine AA is not only related to its comprehensive 
scope but also to its level of ambition, in particular the aim to achieve Ukraine’s economic 
integration in the EU internal market through the establishment of a DCFTA. The objective 
of “deep” integration requires extensive legislative and regulatory approximation including 
sophisticated mechanisms to secure the uniform interpretation and effective implementation 
of relevant EU legislation.
Last but not least, the EU-Ukraine AA is based on a strict conditionality approach. The 
preamble to the agreement explicitly states that “political association and economic integration 
of Ukraine within the European Union will depend on progress in the implementation of the 
current agreement as well as Ukraine’s track record in ensuring respect for common values, and 
progress in achieving convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas.”8 This link 
between the third country’s performance and the deepening of the EU’s engagement is a key 
characteristic of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). 
Whereas this principle has so far been applied on the basis of soft-law instruments such as 
Action Plans and the Association Agenda, it is now encapsulated in a legally binding bilateral 
agreement.
Guillaume Van der Loo, “The EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area: A Coherent 
Mechanism for Legislative Approximation?” in Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law 
in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union. Towards a Common Regulatory Space? eds. Peter 
Van Elsuwege and Roman Petrov (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 63–88.
7 See Title II and III of the EU-Ukraine AA.
8 Emphasis added.
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In what follows, the specific features of the EU-Ukraine AA are analyzed in more detail 
in order to illustrate that the agreement opens a new chapter in the EU’s relations with its 
neighboring countries and, more generally, in its external relations practice. After a brief 
introduction to the background of the new EU-Ukraine AA, its legal basis and objectives are 
discussed. Subsequently, specific attention is devoted to the institutional framework and 
mechanisms of conditionality. A final section deals with the constitutional challenges for the 
effective implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA.
Background of EU-Ukraine Relations: From Partnership 
and Cooperation to Association
The EU-Ukraine AA will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) as the 
basic legal framework of EU-Ukraine relations.9 The PCA, which was signed in 1994, entered 
into force in March 1998 for an initial period of ten years.10 Pursuant to its Article 101, the 
agreement is automatically extended each year unless either side informs the other party of 
its denunciation at least six months before the expiry date. Whereas, from a legal point of view, 
the PCA could therefore continue to apply without formal problems, a revision of the legal 
framework was urgently needed.11 Due to internal developments in both the EU and Ukraine, 
several provisions of the PCA are out of date and no longer reflect the current ambition of the 
bilateral relationship. The preamble and Article 1, for instance, refer to Ukraine as “a country 
with an economy in transition,” which is no longer appropriate after the country’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008.
Moreover, the agreement includes general and broadly defined provisions on economic 
co-operation12 but stops short of any regional trade integration. Article 4 PCA only provides 
that the parties consider “whether circumstances allow the beginning of negotiations on the 
establishment of a free trade area.”13 Like many other provisions of the agreement, this so-called 
“evolutionary clause” is essentially a declaration of intent without any direct legal consequences.
The minimalistic approach of the PCA is particularly well-illustrated as regards the objective 
of approximating Ukraine’s existing and future legislation to that of the EU. While recognizing 
that this process of legislative approximation is an important condition for strengthening the 
economic links between the parties, Article 51 PCA proclaims that Ukraine “shall endeavour 
9 Art. 479 EU-Ukraine AA.
10 Council and Commission Decision of 26 January 1998 on the conclusion of the PCA between the EC 
and their Member States and Ukraine, OJ, 1998, L 49.
11 A similar reasoning applies for the PCAs with Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
With Belarus, a PCA was signed in 1995 but never entered into force due to political reasons.
12 The title “Economic Cooperation” in the PCA contains provisions on industrial cooperation, 
investment promotion and protection, public procurement, co-operation in the field of standards 
and conformity assessment, education and training, energy, environment, cooperation in science and 
technology, tourism, monetary policy, social cooperation, money laundering, regional development, 
information and communication, statistical cooperation, etc.
13 Art. 4 EU-Ukraine PCA.
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to ensure that its legislation be gradually made compatible with that of the Community [now 
Union].”14 This can hardly be regarded as a formal legal commitment. Its vague and open-ended 
formulation gave the Ukrainian authorities a considerable freedom to define the time-schedule 
and methods of implementation. There is only an obligation to act but without a requirement 
to achieve particular results or a sanction in case the approximation of laws obligation is not 
fulfilled. Moreover, the approximation clause includes a long list of “priority areas” for legislative 
action15 but fails to provide clear guidelines on the scope and content of the EU laws to be taken 
as the basis for approximation. Nor does it include a link with the objective to establish a Free 
Trade Area (FTA) in the future.16
The launch of the ENP in the wake of the EU’s eastward enlargement provided new 
impetus to EU-Ukraine relations. In this context, the European Commission proposed to move 
beyond mere cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration in return for concrete 
progress in terms of legal approximation.17 In the short term, an ENP Action Plan —  adopted 
with Ukraine in 2005 for a period of three years —  laid down political and economic priorities 
for reform whereas the negotiation of a new bilateral framework agreement to replace the PCA 
was considered to be a long term objective.18 At the end of 2006, the Commission announced its 
intention to negotiate “deep and comprehensive free trade agreements” (DCFTAs) with the EU’s 
neighbors including “substantially all trade in goods and services” and “strong legally-binding 
provisions on trade and economic regulatory issues.”19
Against the political background of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was the first ENP 
country to start negotiations on a new Association Agreement in March 2007 as part of a general 
revision of the bilateral legal framework. Negotiations on the DCFTA were only launched 
in  February 2008 after Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. A political agreement was reached 
in December 2011 and the EU-Ukraine AA was initialed in March 2012.20 On 15 May 2013, the 
Commission adopted the proposals for a Council Decision on the signing and conclusion of 
14 Art. 51 EU-Ukraine PCA, emphasis added.
15 Art. 51(2) EU-Ukraine PCA refers to customs law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, 
intellectual property, protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition, 
public procurement, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, the environment, 
consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, nuclear laws and transport.
16 Roman Petrov, “Recent Developments in the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law,” 
European Foreign Affairs Review 8.1 (2003): 131.
17 European Commission, “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our 
Eastern and Southern Neighbours,” COM (2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003.
18 In November 2009, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was replaced by a bilateral Association Agenda 
(EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, “Recommendation on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement,”  
UE-UA 1057/0923, 23 November 2009).
19 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy,” COM (2006) 726 final, 
4 December 2006, 4.
20 The DCFTA part was only initialled, after legal scrubbing, in July 2012.
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the EU-Ukraine AA.21 Nevertheless, this agreement was not immediately signed due to demands 
on behalf of the EU to abandon the practice of selective justice and to align the Ukrainian 
judiciary and law enforcement systems with European standards.22 Eventually, on the eve 
of the EaP Summit in Vilnius, the Ukrainian Government decided to suspend the process of 
preparation for signature of the EU-Ukraine AA in order “to ensure the national security of 
Ukraine and to recover trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation.”23 Following 
this news, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians went to the streets. The ensuing Euromaidan 
Revolution led to the dismissal of President Viktor Yanukovych on 22 February 2014 and the 
establishment of an Interim Government under the leadership of Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Proceeding 
with the signature of the EU-Ukraine AA was a clear short-term objective for the new authorities 
in Kyiv.24
Despite the political pressure to act quickly, this was not an evident option. Under 
the Ukrainian Constitution, the President is responsible for the signature of international 
agreements.25 After the escape of Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine only had an acting President 
Oleksandr Turchynov, who had been appointed by the Parliament without an election. Taking 
into account the legal and political significance of the EU-Ukraine AA, including long-term and 
far-reaching commitments of legislative approximation with the EU, this clearly raised some 
questions of legitimacy. At the same time, there was also a growing understanding that a clear 
message of solidarity to the Ukrainian people was needed in light of the mounting Russian 
pressure on Crimea and the Eastern part of Ukraine. In this context, the EU Heads of State 
or Government announced on 6 March 2014 that “as a matter of priority” all the political 
chapters of the EU-Ukraine AA would be signed first. In addition, the adoption of autonomous 
trade measures “would allow Ukraine to benefit substantially from the advantages offered in 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.”26 The signature of the political provisions of 
21 European Commission, “Signature of Association Agreement with the EU will Depend on Ukraine’s 
Performance,” Press Release, May 15, 2013, IP/13/436.
22 3209th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Council Conclusions on Ukraine, 10 December 2012.
23 Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from 21 November 2013, No. 905-p. Arguably, the 
Ukrainian government’s decision cannot be disconnected from the Russian proposal to establish 
a Eurasian Union building upon the already existing customs union between Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. On the background of this initiative and its implications for EU-Ukraine relations, see: 
Peter van Elsuwege and Guillaume Van der Loo, “Competing Paths of Regional Economic Integration 
in the Post-Soviet Space: Legal and Political Dilemmas for Ukraine,” Review of Central and East 
European Law 37 (2012): 421–47.
24 Georgi Gotev, “Ukraine Ready to Sign Association Agreement during March EU Summit,” Euractiv.
com, February 27, 2014, accessed December 30, 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/ukraine-
wants-sign-association-a-news-533818.
25 Art. 106(3) of the Ukrainian Constitution.
26 Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine, Brussels, 6 March 2014, accessed 
December 30, 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/141372. pdf.
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the EU-Ukraine AA effectively took place on 21 March 201427 and on 14 April 2014, after a “fast 
track” approval process, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Regulation “on 
the reduction or elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine.”28 Accordingly, 
Ukraine can benefit from the EU’s unilateral trade preferences in accordance with the schedule 
of concessions set out in annex I-A of the EU-Ukraine AA in anticipation of the (provisional) 
application of the entire agreement.29
It is noteworthy that the political and economic parts of the EU-Ukraine AA remain part 
of a single legal instrument.30 In other words, the partial signature of the agreement on 21 March 
2014 may essentially be regarded as a political gesture underlining the parties’ commitment 
to shared values and the objectives of the envisaged association. The direct legal implications 
are fairly limited because the political provisions are rather general in nature. In addition to a 
list of general principles underlying the bilateral relationship, they include the establishment 
of a multi-level political dialogue and convergence in the field of CFSP. Moreover, this partial 
signature did not result in the entry into force of these “political” chapters, neither to their 
provisional application. It was only after the final signature of the entire agreement on 27 June 
2014 by the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko that the ratification procedure for the 
27 The “political provisions” of the agreement which were signed on 21 March 2014 include the 
preamble, Article 1 (objectives), Title I (general principles), II (political dialogue and reform, political 
association cooperation and convergence in the field of CFSP) and VII (institutional, general and 
final provisions). See: Final Act of the Summit between the EU and its Member States, of the one 
part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards the Association Agreement, accessed December 30, 
2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/association_agreement/final_act_text_
en.pdf>. It must be noted that Title III (justice, freedom and security) can also be considered as 
a “political chapter” of the AA. However, several Member States opposed the signature of this chapter 
on 21 March 2014 as it includes “sensitive” provisions on treatment and mobility of workers and 
movement of persons (Arts. 17–19) (Interview with EEAS official, 22 April 2014).
28 Regulation (EU) No. 374/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
the reduction or elimination of customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine (OJ, 2014, L 118/1).
29 The unilateral trade preferences apply until the DCFTA part of the EU-Ukraine AA (provisionally) 
enters into force and in any case no later than 1 November 2014. It is noteworthy that the EU did 
not request a WTO waiver for the adoption of the autonomous measures (under Art. IX:3 WTO) 
because they anticipate the (provisional) application of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA. Hence, the EU’s 
démarche is deemed to be in conformity with GATT Article XXIV. See, on the development of this 
line of argumentation, the response of the Commission’s representative to questions during the 
meeting of the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA), Brussels, 19–20 
March, accessed December 30, 2014, http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/01/82/EU_18238/
imfname_10451522.pdf.
30 Final Act of the Summit between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the 
other part, as regards the Association Agreement, accessed December 30, 2014, http://eeas.europa.
eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/association_agreement/final_act_text_en.pdf.
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entire agreement could be initiated.31 Because the EU-Ukraine AA is a mixed agreement, which 
needs to be ratified by all 28 EU Member States, this procedure can take several years. In order 
to circumvent this long ratification procedure, Article 486 of the EU-Ukraine AA provides for 
the possibility of the provisional application of the agreement. Given the political significance 
of the EU-Ukraine AA, the Council agreed on an exceptionally wide scope for provisional 
application, including, inter alia, the entire title on General Principles (Title I) and Financial 
Cooperation (Title VI), almost the entire DCFTA (Title IV), Institutional, General and Final 
Provisions (Title VII) and several provisions regarding political dialogue (Arts. 4–6), Justice, 
Freedom and Security (Arts. 14 and 19) and economic and sectoral cooperation. This broad 
scope could raise questions on the provisional application of “mixed” elements of the EU-
Ukraine AA. The Council Decisions state that on the signing of the Agreement that these listed 
provisions shall be applied on a provisional basis “only to the extent that they cover matters 
falling within the Union’s competence, including matters falling within the Union’s competence 
to define and implement a common foreign and security policy.”32 In addition, the Council, 
Commission and High Representative adopted a Joint Statement providing that the provisional 
application of the General Principles set down in Article 2 “is without prejudice to the division 
of competences between the Union and the Member States on the matters referred to therein.”
Legal Basis and Objectives
The comprehensive and complex nature of the EU-Ukraine AA is reflected in the choice of its 
legal basis. The Council Decision on the signing and provisional application of the political 
provisions, adopted on 17 March 2014, combines the legal basis for EU action in the area of CFSP 
(Arts. 31(1) and 37 Treaty on the EU (TEU)) with the traditional provision on association (Art. 217 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)).33 From a procedural point of view, the presence 
of a CFSP legal basis does not make a major difference because association agreements already 
require unanimity in the Council.34 Moreover, the CFSP dimension of the EU-Ukraine AA is too 
limited to overrule Art. 218(6)a(i) TFEU which requires the consent of the European Parliament 
for the conclusion of association agreements.35 Nevertheless, the combination of CFSP/TFEU 
31 The simultaneous ratification of the Association Agreement by Ukrainian Parliament and 
the European Parliament took place on 16 September 2014. Meanwhile the EU-Ukraine AA is under 
lengthy process of ratification by parliaments of the EU Member States. Therefore the interim 
application of the association agreements is taking place in accordance with the EU Council 
decisions (Council Decision 2014/295/EU of 17 March 2014 and COM(2014)609). Application 
of Title IV (deep and comprehensive free trade area) of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement has 
been postponed till 1 January 2016 due to political and security pressure of the Russian Federation.
32 See Art. 4 Council Decision 2014/295/EU.
33 See Art. 4 Council Decision 2014/295/EU.
34 Art. 218(8) TFEU.
35 According to Art. 218(6) TFEU, an association agreement can only be concluded without the consent 
of the European Parliament if it relates “exclusively” to CFSP. In recent Case C-658/11, Commission v. 
Council, the Court of Justice clarified that the substantive legal basis of a Council decision adopted 
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legal bases may be regarded as a logical consequence of the continuing bipolarity of the EU’s 
external action as reflected in Article 40 TEU. The EU-Ukraine AA is one of the first examples of 
this new practice, which stems from the Lisbon Treaty amendments to the procedural code for 
negotiating and concluding international agreements on behalf of the EU.36
A more controversial question concerned the adoption of two separate Council Decisions 
for the signature and provisional application of the remaining titles of the EU-Ukraine AA 
on 27  June 2014.37 Despite the Commission’s proposal for a single decision on the basis of 
Article 217 TFEU, the Council opted to “split off” the provisions relating to the treatment of 
third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of the parties (Art. 17 EU-
Ukraine AA). The latter formed the subject of a separate Council Decision adopted on the 
basis of Article 79(2)(b) TFEU. The main reason for this complexity is the specific status of 
the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect to the EU competences in the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). Pursuant to Protocol 21 to the Treaty of Lisbon, both countries have 
the discretionary power to decide whether or not they want to take part in the adoption of 
legislative acts under this title.38 Taking into account that Article 17 of the EU-Ukraine AA falls 
within the scope of the AFSJ, in particular Article 79(2)(b) TFEU on the rights of third-country 
nationals residing legally in the EU Member States, a separate Council Decision was deemend 
necessary. Nevertheless, this option is not undisputable. Article 17 EU-Ukraine AA is an integral 
part of the estabished association and it seems far-fetched to argue that the aim and content 
of this provision is distinct from and independent of the aim and content of the other provisions 
of the EU-Ukraine AA. Moreover, in its recent judgment in Commission v. Council (Case C-377/12), 
the Court of Justice of the EU (Court of Justice) considered the addition of specific legal bases 
relating to readmission of third-country nationals (Art. 79(3) TFEU), transport (Arts 91 and 
100 TFEU) and environment (Art. 191(4) TFEU) unnecessary and unlawful for the signature of 
a Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and the Republic 
of the Philippines.39 In the Court’s view, the broad scope of Articles 207 and 209 TFEU dealing, 
respectively, with common commercial policy and development cooperation was sufficient 
to cover the entire agreement. Of course, the context and the objectives of the EU-Ukraine 
AA are entirely different. Nevertheless, the argument may be made that Article 217 TFEU on 
association is a “catch-all” provision, which does not require the adoption of a separate Council 
decision related to one specific provision of the agreement. This interpretation was not only 
for the conclusion of an international agreement determines the procedures to followed. Hence, only 
when the substantive legal basis exclusively relates to the area of CFSP, the European Parliament 
does not play a role in this process.
36 The unified procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on behalf 
of the EU is laid down in Art. 218 TFEU.
37 This concerns Title III (freedom, security and justice), IV (trade and trade-related matters), 
V (economic and sector cooperation) and VI (financial cooperation with anti-fraud provisions).
38 Protocol (No. 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area 
of freedom, security and justice, OJ, 2010, C83/295.
39 Case C-377/12, Commission v. Council, Judgment of 11 June 2014, nyr.
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strongly supported by the European Commission40 but also by several Member States. Taking 
into account the political importance of the EU-Ukraine AA, it seems unlikely that the final 
decision to use a “split” legal basis will be challenged before the Court of Justice.
The conclusion of association agreements with European countries is often perceived 
as a stepping-stone towards EU membership. For example, after the signing ceremony on 
27 June 2014, the heads of State or Government of the three associated countries linked the 
conclusion of the AAs with their (long-term) EU membership aspirations. However, there is 
no automatic link between association and accession prospects. The EU-Ukraine AA carefully 
avoids any direct reference to future membership perspectives for Ukraine but somewhat 
diplomatically observes that “the European Union acknowledges the European aspirations of 
Ukraine and welcomes its European choice.” This formulation is somewhat reminiscent of the 
formula used in the old Europe Agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.41 
It does not entail any legal or political commitment towards further enlargement on behalf of 
the Union. The EU-Ukraine AA is thus not a pre-accession agreement such as the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkan countries,42 however, it neither 
excludes a membership perspective. In this view, the preamble states that “this Agreement shall 
not prejudice and leaves open future developments in EU-Ukraine relations.” In addition, the 
parties explicitly recognize that “Ukraine as a European country shares a common history and 
common values with the Member States of the EU and is committed to promoting those values.” 
The parallels with the first sentence of Article 49 TEU are obvious. Moreover, it is noteworthy 
that several provisions reflect the formulation of the Copenhagen pre-accession criteria. Political 
criteria such as stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are not only defined as “essential elements” of the EU-Ukraine AA,43 
they are also an integral part of the established political dialogue44 and cooperation in the area of 
freedom, security and justice.45 At the economic level, the establishment of a DCFTA is regarded 
as an instrument “to complete [Ukraine’s] transition into a functioning market economy.”46 Last 
but not least, the entire agreement is based on Ukraine’s commitment to achieve “convergence 
with the EU in political, economic and legal areas.”
40 In a Statement on this Council Decision, the Commission declared that it has mode one proposal for 
one Decision based on Art. 217 TFEU and, therefore, “disagrees with the addition of legal bases, in 
particular Article 79(2)(b), with the effect in particular of splitting the Decision.”
41 For instance, in the preamble to the EA with Poland the parties recognized “the fact that the final 
objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and that this association […] will 
help to achieve this objective.” In other words, accession was regarded as a clear ambition of the 
associated states but not as a mutual objective.
42 The SAAs explicitly refer to the Western Balkan countries’ status as “a potential candidate for EU 
membership.” Also the Association Agreement with Turkey is conceived to “facilitate the accession 
of Turkey to the [Union] at a later date.”
43 Preamble EU-Ukraine AA.
44 Art. 6 EU-Ukraine AA.
45 Art. 14 EU-Ukraine AA.
46 Art. 1(2)(d) EU-Ukraine AA.
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Nevertheless, the EU-Ukraine AA does not aim at the preparation of Ukraine’s accession 
to the EU but at the establishment of “close and privileged links.”47 In other words, the key 
objective of the EU-Ukraine AA is to ensure Ukraine’s partial integration in the EU without 
offering any concrete membership perspective. It is well known that such a process raises 
significant challenges in terms of the EU acquis export and, in particular, for the uniform 
interpretation and application of the shared legal framework within legal systems of third 
countries.48 For this purpose, the Association Agreement with Ukraine introduces a reinforced 
institutional framework, enhanced forms of conditionality and sophisticated mechanisms for 
legal approximation and dispute settlement which are distinct from other existing models of 
integration without membership.
A Reinforced Institutional Framework
The EU-Ukraine AA establishes a multi-level institutional framework that is based on practices 
of other EU association agreements but bears some considerable novelties. Summit meetings 
at the highest political level are to take place on an annual basis providing overall guidance 
for the implementation of the agreement and an opportunity to discuss issues of mutual 
interest.49 This is a confirmation of an already existing practice even though the EU-Ukraine 
PCA did not include such an explicit provision. A more significant development for the EU-
Ukraine relations is the creation of an Association Council, meeting at the Ministerial level, 
with decision-making capacities.50 The Association Council plays a crucial role in the process 
of legislative approximation. It operates as a forum for exchange of information on EU and 
Ukrainian legislative acts and is competent to update or amend the agreement’s annexes to 
keep pace with evolutions in EU law.51 An Association Committee with representatives at senior 
civil servant level assists the Association Council in the performance of its duties.52 Moreover, 
specific sub-committees can be established.53 Civil society cooperation forms a specific chapter 
of the EU-Ukraine AA and aims, amongst others, to ensure a better mutual knowledge and 
understanding between the parties.54 Civil Society institutions are expected to play a role 
in the field of trade and sustainable development55 and to be involved in social and cultural 
dialogues.56 This civil society component reflects its importance within the framework of the 
47 Art. 1(2)(a) EU-Ukraine AA.
48 Łazowski, supra note 7, 1433.
49 Art. 460 EU-Ukraine AA.
50 Under the EU-Ukraine PCA there was only a Co-operation Council which could only adopt 
recommendations but no binding decisions.
51 Art. 463 EU-Ukraine AA. Specific procedures are applicable with regard to legislative approximation 
in areas related to the DCFTA.
52 Art. 464 EU-Ukraine AA.
53 Art. 466 EU-Ukraine AA.
54 Chapter 26, including Arts. 443–45 of the EU-Ukraine AA.
55 Art. 299 EU-Ukraine AA.
56 Art. 421 and 438 EU-Ukraine AA.
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Eastern Partnership and complements the multilateral Civil Society Forum that was established 
after the 2009 Prague Eastern Partnership Summit.
Enhanced Conditionality in the EU-Ukraine AA
Conditionality is one of the key strategic tools of the ENP and it is, therefore, no surprise that 
this instrument also occupies a prominent place in the EU-Ukraine AA. Two different forms of 
conditionality can be distinguished. On the one hand, the Agreement includes several provisions 
related to Ukraine’s commitment to the common European values of democracy, rule of law 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (“common values” conditionality). 
On the other hand, the part on the DCFTA is based on an explicit “market access” conditionality 
implying that Ukraine will only be granted additional access to a section of the EU Internal 
Market if the EU decides, after a strict monitoring procedure, that Ukraine successfully 
implemented its legislative approximation commitments. Both forms of conditionality bear 
some revolutionary features in comparison to other external agreements concluded between 
the EU and third countries.
Common Values Conditionality
International agreements concluded on behalf of the EU include standard conditionality 
clauses. In general, an “essential element clause” defining the core common values of the 
relationship is combined with a “suspension” clause including a procedure to suspend the 
agreement in case of violation of those essential elements. Such a mechanism is also included 
in the EU-Ukraine AA.57 Yet, the common values conditionality in the EU-Ukraine AA differs 
from similar provisions included in, for instance, the SAAs with the Western Balkans. First, in 
addition to the standard reference to democratic principles, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as defined by international legal instruments (Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris 
for a New Europe, the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms),58 a specific reference to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is included in Article 6 EU-Ukraine AA on “dialogue and cooperation 
on domestic reform”59 and in Article 14 EU-Ukraine AA dealing with EU-Ukraine cooperation 
on justice, freedom and security. Second, the essential elements of the EU-Ukraine AA contain 
common values that go beyond classical human rights and also include very strong security 
elements such as the “promotion of respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, inviolability of borders and independence, as well as countering the proliferation 
57 Art. 2 in conjunction with Art. 478 EU-Ukraine AA.
58 Art. 2 EU-Ukraine AA. The same principles and legal instruments are mentioned in Art. 2 of the SAA 
with Serbia.
59 This dialogue foresees that the parties “shall cooperate in order to ensure that their internal policies 
are based on principles common to the parties, in particular, stability and effectiveness of democratic 
institutions and the rule of law and on respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
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of weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery.”60 Third, “the 
principles of free market economy” as well as a list of other issues such as “rule of law, the 
fight against corruption, the fight against the different forms of transnational organised crime 
and terrorism, the promotion of sustainable development and effective multilateralism” are 
not included in the definition of essential elements.61 Rather, they are considered to “underpin” 
the relationship between the parties and are “central to enhancing” this relationship.62 In other 
words, a distinction is made between hard core common values related to fundamental rights 
and security, and a range of other general principles that are deemed crucial for developing 
closer relations but which cannot trigger the suspension of the entire agreement.63
Market Access Conditionality
Apart from the more general “common values” conditionality, the EU-Ukraine AA entails 
a specific form of “market access” conditionality, which is explicitly linked to the process of 
legislative approximation. Hence, it is one of the specific mechanisms introduced to tackle 
the challenges of integration without membership. Of particular significance is a far-reaching 
monitoring of Ukraine’s efforts to approximate national legislation to EU law, including aspects 
of implementation and enforcement.64 To facilitate the assessment process, the Ukrainian 
government is obliged to provide reports to the EU in line with approximation deadlines 
specified in the Agreement.65 In addition to the drafting of progress reports, which is a common 
practice within the EU’s pre-accession strategy and the ENP, the monitoring procedure may 
include “on-the-spot missions, with the participation of EU institutions, bodies and agencies, 
non-governmental bodies, supervisory authorities, independent experts and others as 
needed.”66 Arguably, the latter option is a new and far-reaching instrument introduced precisely 
to guarantee that legislative approximation goes beyond a formal adaptation of national 
legislation.
60 Art. 2 EU-Ukraine AA. In comparison, Arts. 2 and 3 of the SAA with Serbia only include full 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as essential elements of the agreement. On the other 
hand, Art. 2 of the SAA includes a general reference to “respect for principles of international law,” 
which is not in Art. 2 of the EU-Ukraine AA.
61 Art. 3 EU-Ukraine AA. In contrast, Art. 2 of the SAA with Serbia includes the principles of the market 
economy in the list of essential elements.
62 Art. 3 EU-Ukraine AA.
63 Art. 478 EU-Ukraine AA foresees that a suspension of the entire agreement, including the part on 
Trade and Trade-related measures, is only possible in case of violation of the essential elements 
or in accordance with the general rules of international law.
64 Art. 475(2) EU-Ukraine AA.
65 Art. 475(2) EU-Ukraine AA.
66 Art. 475(3) EU-Ukraine AA.
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Constitutional Challenges for the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA
After the long and difficult process leading to the signing and conclusion of the EU-Ukraine 
AA, significant challenges for the effective implementation of this ambitious legal framework 
need to be addressed. Three issues can be distinguished: the implications of Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea, the status of the EU-Ukraine AA and decisions of the Association Council in the 
Ukrainian legal system and the potential direct effect of the Agreement in the EU legal order.
The Crimea Question and the Territorial Scope of the EU-Ukraine AA
The text of the EU-Ukraine AA was already initialed before the Russian annexation of Crimea.67 
Consequently, this issue and its impact on the territorial scope of application of the EU-Ukraine 
AA are not addressed in the text of the agreement. Nevertheless, the question has important 
implications, in particular for the DCFTA part and the determination of the rules of origin.68
According to the European Council, the EU “strongly condemns the illegal annexation of 
Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and will not recognize it.”69 Consequently, it 
can be argued that products from the Crimea region are by the EU still considered to be goods 
originating in Ukraine and, therefore, benefit from the preferential trade regime foreseen in 
the DCFTA or in the EU’s autonomous trade preferences. However, in practice, only Russian 
authorities will be able to issue the relevant origin certificates for products manufactured 
or processed in Crimea. As confirmed by the Court of Justice, the EU cannot accept the proof 
of origin issued by authorities other than those designed by name in the relevant (preferential) 
agreement.70 Because there are no competent customs authorities in Crimea to establish the 
origin of the goods as “Ukrainian,” the products de facto cannot, in fact, benefit from preferential 
treatment of the DCFTA. Meanwhile, the European Council has asked the Commission to 
evaluate the legal consequences of the annexation of Crimea and to propose economic, trade 
and financial restrictions regarding Crimea for rapid implementation. On a proposal by the 
Commission, the Council made a first step in this regard on 23 June 2014 when it prohibited the 
import of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol into the EU. However, goods originating in 
Crimea or Sevastopol, which have been granted a certificate of origin by Ukrainian authorities, 
67 On 18 March 2014, the Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed between 
representatives of Crimea and the Russian Federation after a referendum was held in Crimea 
on 16 March 2014.
68 It is noteworthy that EU preferential trade agreements with other “contested” territories such as the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or the Israeli settlements in the West Bank already triggered 
discussion on the territorial scope of these agreements and the application of their rules of origin. 
See: Case C-432/92, Anastasiou (Pissouri) [1994] ECR I-3087; Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH, [2010] ECR 
I-01289.
69 European Council Conclusion, Brussels, 20/21 March 2014, EUCO 7/1/14, para. 29.
70 Court of Justice, Case C-432/92, Anastasiou (Pissouri) [1994] ECR I-3087.
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may still be imported into the EU.71 Moreover, in the Final Act between the EU and Ukraine as 
regards the EU-Ukraine AA, the parties agree that the Agreement:
“shall apply to the entire territory of Ukraine as recognized under international 
law and shall engage in consultations with a view to determine the effects of the 
Agreement with regard to the illegally annexed territory of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol in which the Ukrainian Government currently 
does not exercise effective control.”72
Ukraine regards the territory of Crimea as “temporary occupied territory” and continues to 
consider the Ukrainian Constitution and legal system applicable therein.73 It means that 
residents of Crimea and Sevastopol holding Ukrainian citizenship (and Russian citizenship if 
it was issued automatically without consent of Ukrainian national) may enjoy rights under the 
EU-Ukraine AA on the same basis as the Ukrainian nationals. The status of Ukrainian companies 
established in Crimea and Sevastopol is not defined yet. However, without doubt, a future Law 
on Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA must determine the status of Ukrainian nationals 
and companies residing in Crimea and Sevastopol with regard to application of the EU-Ukraine 
AA in detail.
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Ukrainian Constitution
The implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA creates important challenges from the perspective 
of Ukrainian constitutional law. According to Article 9 of the 1996 Constitution:
International treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada 
[Parliament] of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine.
The conclusion of international treaties that contravene the Constitution of Ukraine 
is possible only after introducing relevant amendments to the Constitution of 
Ukraine.74
This provision implies that, after ratification, the EU-Ukraine AA will be an integral part of the 
Ukrainian legal order. Pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Law of Ukraine “On International Treaties 
71 Council of the European Union, “EU prohibits imports of goods from Crimea and Sevastopol,” Press 
346, June 23, 2014.
72 Final Act between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their 
Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards the Association Agreement, 
27 June 2014, OJ, 2014, L 161.
73 Law of Ukraine “On Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Nationals and Legal Regime on the 
Temporary Occupied Territory of Ukraine” of 15 April 2014, No. 1207-VII.
74 Full text in English is available on the website of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, accessed 
December 30, 2014, http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en.
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of Ukraine,” it will enjoy priority over conflicting national legislation.75 However, this is not the 
case if there is a conflict with the provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution. In this respect, it 
is noteworthy that some of the EU-Ukraine AA provisions impose commitments on Ukraine 
that directly contradict the national Constitution. For instance, Article 8 EU-Ukraine AA binds 
Ukraine to ratify and implement the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court and its 
related instruments. However, in a judgment of 11 July 2001, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
concluded that several provisions of the Rome Statute were not in conformity with the national 
Constitution.76 Consequently, the ratification of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal 
Court by the Verkhovna Rada is only possible after a constitutional revision and a positive ruling 
of the Constitutional Court.77 Another issue concerns the approximation of Ukrainian legislation 
to the dynamic EU acquis. Taking into account that Ukrainian institutions are not involved in 
the decision-making process of EU legislation, the question arises to what extent this can be 
reconciled with fundamental constitutional principles such as legality and sovereignty.78
One of the major problems to be solved in the course of implementation and application of 
the EU-Ukraine AA is the lack of direct enforceability of international agreements in the Ukrainian 
legal order.79 In particular, the question arises how binding decisions of the Association Council 
will be applied in Ukraine. The Ukrainian legal system has never experienced the necessity to apply 
binding decisions of institutions established under the framework of an international agreement. 
Therefore, the adoption of a special implementation law clarifying the implications of the EU-
Ukraine AA for the application and interpretation of national legislation is a crucial prerequisite 
75 Article 19(2) of Law of Ukraine “On International Treaties of Ukraine” of 29 June 2004, No. 1906-IV 
provides that “If duly ratified international treaty of Ukraine contains other rules then relevant 
national legal act of Ukraine rules of the respective international treaty should be applied.”
76 Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on compatibility of the Constitution of Ukraine to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 11 July 2001, No. 1–35/2001. In particular, 
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine found the reference in Article 1 of the Rome Statute that “[the 
Court] shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions” as contrary to provisions of the 
Constitution of Ukraine which prohibit delegation of judicial powers to other bodies then the 
Ukrainian courts and establishment of new courts that are not provided in the Constitution.
77 Interim President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov asked the Constitutional Court of Ukraine to rule 
on constituonality of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 22 May 
2014.
78 Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides that “The right to determine and change the 
constitutional order in Ukraine shall belong exclusively to the people and shall not be usurped by the 
State, its bodies, or officials.”
79 This happens mainly due to: 1) the belief that international case law is not relevant to continental 
law systems; 2) the translation of case law and jurisprudence; 3) lack of translation of case law 
into Ukrainian to help judges adapt their decisions to best European standards. Furthermore, the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is not always expedient in solving conflicts between ratified international 
agreements and national legislation. For more detail see Roman Petrov and Paul Kalinichenko, “The 
Europeanization of Third Country Judiciaries through the Application of the EU Acquis: The Cases of 
Russia and Ukraine,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 60.2 (2011): 325–53.
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to tackle most challenges of legislative approximation. Notably, Ukraine has already gained 
some experience in ensuring the implementation of international norms after the ratification 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1997. The incorporation of the ensuing 
obligations took place by means of two laws. The first was a  law on ratification of the ECHR 
wherein Ukraine recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR).80 
The second was a special law on the application of case law of the ECtHR in Ukraine. It imposed 
on Ukraine a duty of mandatory and timely execution of all ECtHR judgments.81 In accordance 
with these laws judgments of the ECtHR are being formally accepted by the national judiciary as 
sources of law and Ukrainian judges frequently refer to the ECtHR judgments in their decisions. 
However, the rate of effective application of the ECtHR case law in Ukraine is considered as 
unsatisfactory and lags far behind other European countries.82
Concluding Remarks
Taking into account the comprehensive nature of the agreement and the underlying 
conditionality approach, the EU-Ukraine AA occupies, together with the Moldova and Georgia 
AAs, a unique position within the network of bilateral agreements concluded between the EU 
and third countries.
It is a truly innovative legal instrument in the EU’s external relations practice based on 
comprehensiveness, complexity and conditionality. The EU-Ukraine AA does not go as far as 
the EEA Agreement, which extends the entire EU Internal Market acquis to the participating 
EFTA States on the basis of homogeneity. Yet, in certain specific areas where full internal 
market treatment is foreseen, such as in several sections on services and establishment, certain 
arrangements under the EU-Ukraine AA are comparable to the mechanism for legislative 
approximation under the EEA Agreement. A key difference, of course, is the far-reaching 
market accession conditionality as foreseen under the EU-Ukraine AA. Based upon a strict 
monitoring process, apparently inspired by the pre-accession methodology, not only the process 
of legislative approximation but also —  and most importantly —  the effective enforcement 
and implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA is subject to permanent scrutiny. This market access 
conditionality illustrates that the EU is very cautious to open up its Internal Market for third 
countries which have a less stable political and economic system than the EEA countries.
As an innovative legal instrument, the EU-Ukraine AA also fundamentally differs from 
other agreements with the EU’s neighboring countries. It creates a single legal framework 
80 Law of Ukraine “On Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, First Protocol 
and Protocols No. 2, 4, 7 and 11” of 17 July 1997, No. 475/97-ВР. (Please note that here “BP” is printed in 
Latin letters, however for finding this law at the website of Ukrainian Parliament it shall be entered in 
Cyrillic.)
81 Law of Ukraine “On Execution of Judgments and Application of Case Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights” of 23 February 2006, No. 3477-IV.
82 For example see the 7th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers, “Supervision of the Execution 
of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 2013,” accessed August 30, 2015, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM_annreport2013_en.pdf.
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opposed to the Swiss model of sectoral bilateralism and it is not sector-specific such as the 
multilateral EnC Treaty or the ECAA. Rather, the EU-Ukraine AA incorporates certain bits 
and pieces derived from other agreements and policies. Accordingly, it forms a new type of 
integration without membership, with all legal complexities this entails.
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